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I. INTRODUCTION: 
 
The revolutionary changes in the health care field over 
the past decade have spawned many novel market 
arrangements. Perhaps the most significant development is 
the ascendency of managed-care driven health maintenance 
organizations ("HMOs"), whose hold over a large number of 
subscribers has permitted them to wield considerable 
economic power over health care providers. This antitrust, 
civil RICO, and state law tortious interference case against 
defendant U.S. Healthcare, one of the nation's largest 
HMO's, two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, and three of 
its top officers, is an exemplar of the legal fallout from this 
development. 
 
This appeal presents several quite difficult and important 
first impression questions for us, including: (1)  whether the 
defendants' use of economic fear in the context of hard 
business bargaining constitutes wrongful conduct 
amounting to extortion for civil RICO purposes; (2)  whether 
the inability of the plaintiff to prevail on antitrust and 
extortion-based civil RICO claims forecloses a successful 
state law tortious interference claim based on the same 
facts; and (3) whether the defendants' hard bargai ning 
constituted "wrongful means" so as to forfeit the defense of 
privileged business competition to a tortious interference 
claim. 
 
The lawsuit emanates from U.S. Healthcare's refusal to 
approve the application of a new Abington, Pennsylvania 
store of "I Got It at Gary's" ("Gary's"), a small southeastern 
Pennsylvania pharmacy, health and beauty aid chain, for 
membership in U.S. Healthcare's network of medical 
prescription providers. U.S. Healthcare conditioned 
membership in its provider network on Gary's agreement to 
discontinue its contractual relationship with plaintiff 
Brokerage Concepts, Inc. ("BCI"), a health care consulting 
firm whose specialty is serving as a Third Party 
Administrator ("TPA") for health benefit self-insurers (such 
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as Gary's), and to give its TPA business to a U.S. Healthcare 
subsidiary, Corporate Health Administrators ("CHA"). 
 
U.S. Healthcare also applied pressure on Gary's in other 
ways -- through "hard-ball" negotiation tactics, which 
deliberately left Gary's "hanging" as to whether its new 
application would be approved, and a seemingly vindictive 
audit of Gary's generic prescription drug dispensing policy 
at one of its stores that was already part of the 
U.S. Healthcare network. Since U.S. Healthcare subscribers 
constituted a significant portion of its customer base, 
Gary's understandably yielded to the pressure and gave its 
TPA business to CHA. BCI thereupon sued in federal 
district court asserting Sherman Act and civil RICO claims, 
as well as a claim of tortious interference with contractual 
relations under Pennsylvania law. BCI sought 
compensatory and treble damages, injunctive relief, and 
counsel fees on its antitrust and civil RICO claims, and 
compensatory and punitive damages on its state law 
tortious interference claim. Gary's is not a party to the 
lawsuit. 
 
The case proceeded to trial before a jury, which rendered 
a verdict finding U.S. Healthcare and its officers liable to 
BCI on all of BCI's claims, and awarding compensatory and 
punitive damages. On post-trial motions, the district court 
upheld the verdict but ruled that: (1) BCI must elect 
between the punitive damages awarded on its state law 
claim and the treble damages awarded on its federal claims 
(i.e., that it cannot recover both); and (2) if it elects the 
state law remedies, BCI cannot also collect the attorney's 
fees that are available under its RICO and antitrust claims. 
The defendants' appeal of the district court's denial of its 
post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in 
the alternative, for a new trial, attacks the jury verdict on 
all fronts, asserting that the verdict is tainted by erroneous 
evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, and also that 
there is insufficient evidence to sustain any of the claims 
under proper instructions. BCI cross-appeals, contending 
that, under Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 
F.2d 171, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1992), the district court erred in 
requiring BCI to elect which remedies it will recover, and 
also in refusing to award injunctive relief to BCI under 
either RICO or the antitrust laws. 
 
                                6 
  
Because all three of BCI's claims are grounded upon 
U.S. Healthcare's leveraging of its economic power, and 
because, under the jury instructions given by the district 
court, the RICO and state law claims may depend on the 
existence of a viable antitrust claim, the threshold doctrinal 
battleground has been over antitrust law. This aspect of the 
case is quite complex, not because of the need for 
sophisticated economic analysis or the resolution of any 
close or cutting-edge trade regulation issue, but rather 
because of the difficulty of attempting to shoehorn into the 
traditional antitrust model a claim that resists such 
characterization. 
 
The matter was presented to the district court primarily 
as a tying case, under which a plaintiff can assert both a 
per se and a "rule of reason" claim. In a typical tying case, 
a seller leverages its market power in the market for the 
tying product to require the buyer of the product to 
purchase an unwanted product in the tied market, thereby 
(unlawfully) foreclosing competition in that market. But 
Gary's, the party who has been "put upon," is a seller, not 
a buyer, in the tying product market: when U.S. Healthcare 
accepts Gary's into its network of providers, what Gary's 
gains is the opportunity to sell drugs to U.S. Healthcare 
subscribers. The defendants, in contrast, contend that the 
case is better viewed as one of reciprocal dealing which, 
they submit, carries with it less stringent antitrust 
standards. 
 
As will appear, our disposition of BCI's antitrust claim 
will take us through a number of layers of analysis, dealing 
with both its per se and rule of reason claims, and in the 
course thereof treating such matters as product market 
definition (and the applicability vel non of the decision in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Images Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 
451 (1992)); geographic market definition (and the lack of 
utility of a flawed market survey in identifying the market); 
and above all, with the sufficiency of the record evidence 
(including the inferences which can be drawn therefrom) to 
support a legally viable antitrust claim. In the end, we 
conclude that, since the record before us does not support 
a finding that U.S. Healthcare exercised appreciable market 
power in a properly defined tying market, or that the 
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arrangement at issue harmed competition in the tied 
market, the antitrust jury verdicts on both the per se and 
the rule of reason claims must be set aside. 
 
In support of its civil RICO claim, BCI alleges a variety of 
predicate acts, as a civil RICO claim requires. Although we 
deal with all of the predicate acts invoked, rejecting 
defendants' contention that BCI lacks RICO standing, the 
only acts that arguably could come within RICO's ambit are 
alleged extortionate acts by the defendants. Under the 
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1951, "[e]xtortion" is defined as "the 
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, 
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, 
violence, or fear." 18 U.S.C. S 1951(b)(2). The "fear" may be 
of economic loss as well as of physical harm. See United 
States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir. 1972). In this 
case, the evidence is clear that U.S. Healthcare employed 
economic leverage in an effort to force Gary's to chose CHA 
as its TPA. However, while BCI contends that this conduct 
amounts to extortion through the wrongful use of the fear 
of economic loss, defendants assert that the conduct is 
merely hard business bargaining that cannot be made to fit 
within the statutory framework of Hobbs Act extortion. 
 
As will be shown, resolution of BCI's extortion claim 
turns on whether the defendants' use of economic fear in 
the context of hard business bargaining was legally 
wrongful, an issue with which we have not previously had 
occasion to deal. We conclude that the "claim of right" 
defense to extortion (i.e., a defense based on a lawful claim 
to the property obtained by the allegedly extortionate acts) 
formulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), is applicable in cases, such 
as this one, which involve solely the allegation of the use of 
economic fear in a transaction between two private parties. 
In so concluding, we are mindful of, and address, those 
cases that reject the broad application of Enmons outside of 
the labor context in which it arose for fear that it would 
"effectively repeal the Hobbs Act." See United States v. 
Agnes, 753 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
Having determined that the claim of right defense is 
available to the defendants in this case, we address the 
difficult problem of separating out lawful from unlawful 
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claims to property. We make no effort to announce any 
broad principles in this difficult area. Drawing instruction 
from Enmons and Viacom Int'l v. Icahn, 747 F. Supp. 205 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), we make a rule only for a very narrow 
subset of the potential universe of extortion cases: one 
involving the accusation of the wrongful use of economic 
fear where two private parties have engaged in a mutually 
beneficial exchange of property. We conclude that BCI's 
extortion claim can only survive if Gary's had a right to 
pursue its business interests free of the fear that it would 
be excluded from U.S. Healthcare's provider network. Albeit 
with misgivings, we find that since Pennsylvania, unlike 
other states, has no "Any Willing Provider" law that compels 
HMOs to allow all interested and minimally qualified 
providers into their network, BCI had no such right. If such 
a law was in force, Gary's would have had a legal 
entitlement to be a member of the provider network and 
thus to be free of the fear that it would be excluded from 
that network if it did not switch TPA providers. Having 
determined that BCI did not present a sustainable case of 
extortion, or establish any of the other predicate acts 
alleged, we set aside the jury verdict as to the civil RICO 
count. 
 
That BCI's federal claims have fallen is not, however, the 
end of its case. BCI also alleges the defendants unlawfully 
and improperly interfered with its existing and prospective 
contractual relations with Gary's in violation of 
Pennsylvania tort law. While BCI must prove a number of 
things to prevail on a tortious interference claim under 
Pennsylvania law, only one is in serious dispute here. The 
battleground is over Restatement (Second) of Torts S 768 
which sets forth a competitors privilege, and in fact over 
only one facet of that section, S 768(1)(d), which withdraws 
immunity from liability if the competitor employs "wrongful 
means." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to define 
that term and hence we must predict how it would do so to 
resolve this case. 
 
The parties' debate in this area was focused primarily on 
whether Pennsylvania would limit wrongful means to 
conduct that is independently actionable. While the parties 
have ably briefed that point, the disposition of BCI's claim 
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does not require us to resolve it. Rather, we conclude, 
based upon a passage from S 768 comment (e), that even if 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were to require 
independently actionable means, it would not apply that 
requirement in cases, such as this one, where the 
defendant exerted "economic pressure" or "a superior 
power" in a market unrelated to the competitive market. 
Here, BCI proffered ample evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that U.S. Healthcare attempted to acquire Gary's 
TPA business by threatening Gary's with withdrawal of 
membership in the U.S. Healthcare provider network, an 
unrelated market. BCI also adduced evidence of heavy- 
handed tactics by U.S. Healthcare in that market for 
pharmacy customers. 
 
In addition to our analysis of the substance of 
Pennsylvania tort law, we address defendants' more 
fundamental argument that tort liability is not appropriate 
here. The crux of that argument is that BCI's tort claims 
are predicated on the same conduct that underlie its federal 
claims, and that the law should therefore not permit BCI to 
repackage these failed claims as tortious interference. As 
will be shown, in our view, BCI has attempted just the 
opposite. That is, it has taken conduct that constitutes 
tortious interference with contractual relations and has 
attempted to turn it into a violation of both federal antitrust 
and racketeering laws. While these attempts have been 
frustrated on this appeal, that result does not foreclose 
BCI's state law claim. BCI's tortious interference claim does 
not require proof of criminal conduct as does its extortion 
claim, nor is it anchored in the same kind of market based 
considerations as is its antitrust claim. We see no need for 
congruence between federal antitrust law, which is 
designed to protect competition and free access to markets, 
and state business tort law, which is designed to protect 
competitors. 
 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the tortious interference 
verdict cannot stand, and a new trial on the tort claims is 
necessary, because the jury instructions permitted the jury 
to find tortious interference based on antitrust and/or civil 
RICO violations which, we have concluded, did not exist. 
Hence, while we reverse outright on the antitrust and civil 
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RICO claims, we will remand the tortious interference 
claims for a new trial. We intimate no view on the question 
whether defendants' behavior was outrageous enough to 
justify an award of punitive damages under Pennsylvania 
law; that will be for determination on remand. Since the 
antitrust and RICO claims are out of the case, we also need 
not address the question of the propriety of injunctive relief 
for either RICO or antitrust claims, or the interesting issues 
posed by the cross-appeal. 
 
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. The Parties 
 
BCI serves as a TPA for employers who wish to self- 
insure for their health benefits and other insurance needs. 
In this capacity, BCI designs the employer's self-insured 
benefit plan and usually recommends a health services 
provider network. The providers in the network then supply 
the health care, and BCI reviews and processes the 
resulting claims for the employer. In addition, BCI typically 
helps the employer purchase "stop-loss" insurance policies 
that cap the employers' exposure for large individual and 
aggregate claims. BCI also serves as an insurance broker 
for employees who choose to purchase fully-insured 
policies. 
 
U.S. Healthcare develops, owns, operates, and markets 
HMOs in many states in the eastern United States, 
including Pennsylvania and New Jersey. These HMOs are 
operated by wholly owned subsidiaries, including defendant 
United States Healthcare Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc., 
d/b/a The Health Maintenance Organization of 
Pennsylvania ("HMO PA"), which operates as 
U.S. Healthcare's HMO for Pennsylvania. As of December 
31, 1994, U.S. Healthcare and its subsidiaries had 
approximately 1,695,000 subscribers enrolled in its insured 
plans. 
 
CHA is also a wholly owned subsidiary of 
U.S. Healthcare. It is a TPA, and provides the same type of 
services for self-insured employers as does BCI. In the 
geographic areas in which U.S. Healthcare operates an 
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HMO, CHA utilizes only the U.S. Healthcare network of 
doctors and hospitals. Similarly, U.S. Healthcare bars all 
TPAs other than CHA access to its network. At all times 
relevant to the present dispute, defendant Richard Wolfson 
was the Director of Pharmacy Programs and the Chairman 
of the Board of U.S. Healthcare, defendant William 
Brownstein served as the Regional Pharmacy Director for 
Pennsylvania, and defendant Scott Murphy was the Senior 
Vice President of U.S. Healthcare, and the senior marketing 
executive for CHA. We will at times refer to U.S. Healthcare, 
CHA, and HMO PA collectively as the "corporate 
defendants," and Wolfson, Brownstein and Murphy 
collectively as the "individual defendants." 
 
B. Gary's Decision to Self-insure 
 
U.S. Healthcare has established a network of health care 
providers which includes doctors, hospitals, and 
pharmacies in various geographic regions. Under the 
U.S. Healthcare prescription purchase program, individuals 
who enroll as subscribers in U.S. Healthcare's HMOs select 
one pharmacy from the network of providers at which they 
will purchase prescription drugs. Subscribers can change 
their pharmacy designation by filling out a form. Under this 
program, subscribers can purchase their prescription drugs 
for a small co-payment (such as $5.00), with the rest of the 
cost of the prescription reimbursed to the pharmacy by 
U.S. Healthcare. In addition, U.S. Healthcare pays the 
pharmacies that serve the prescription purchase plan a set 
monthly amount based on the number of U.S. Healthcare 
subscribers designating that pharmacy, without regard to 
the actual purchases of drugs from that pharmacy. 
Because subscribers seldom purchase prescription drugs 
from pharmacies other than those within the network, 
membership in the U.S. Healthcare network is highly 
coveted. 
 
In 1991, Eagleville Pharmacy, Incorporated, d/b/a/ I Got 
It At Gary's ("Gary's") was a pharmacy chain of four stores 
in suburban Philadelphia. All four stores served as 
approved providers in the U.S. Healthcare pharmacy 
network. At this time, Gary's offered its full-time employees 
two options for their health insurance coverage: a Blue 
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Cross/Blue Shield plan and a U.S. Healthcare HMO. 
Approximately 35 Gary's employees enrolled as 
U.S. Healthcare members. In 1991, to save costs, Gary's 
decided to terminate its relationship with Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield and U.S. Healthcare, and to self-insure. 
 
In need of a TPA to process its claims, Gary's evaluated 
several contenders, and then entered a written contract 
with BCI, terminable upon 30 days prior written notice. 
Sandra Chen, the benefits manager at Gary's, sent 
termination letters to Blue Cross/Blue Shield and  
U.S. Healthcare.1 In response to the letter, Chen testified 
that she received an angry and verbally abusive phone call 
from an unidentified U.S. Healthcare marketing executive.2 
So began the wrath of U.S. Healthcare. Upon receipt of 
Gary's letter terminating its insurance contract, David 
Rocchino, one of U.S. Healthcare's sales vice-presidents, 
telephoned Wolfson to inform him of the new development 
and expressed his displeasure. Wolfson became "upset" 
that Gary's had decided to self-insure, and knowing that 
Gary's was approved to serve as a pharmacy for 
U.S. Healthcare subscribers, promptly ordered an internal 
"quality assurance" review of the generic utilization rates of 
Gary's stores. Wolfson admitted at trial that his only reason 
for ordering such a review was that Gary's had terminated 
U.S. Healthcare coverage for its employees, but he testified 
that ordering a retaliatory review was not inappropriate.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The letter to U.S. Healthcare read: 
 
         Dear Sirs: 
 
         This letter is to advise U.S. Healthcare that effective June 
30th, 
         1991, . . . Gary's will discontinue its medical insurance 
coverage 
         with your organization. Please adjust your records to reflect 
this 
         upcoming change and advise me of any information you may need 
         to finalize our relationship. 
 
2. In contrast, Chen testified to the receipt of a polite and professional 
phone call from a Blue Cross/Blue Shield representative, inquiring if 
they could accommodate Gary's needs in anyway and as to the reason 
behind Gary's decision to cancel their health care contract. 
 
3. When asked by BCI's counsel whether he ordered the review of Gary's 
in response to Gary's decision to terminate with U.S. Healthcare, Wolfson 
responded: 
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In August 1993, Gary's opened its fifth store, in 
Abington, Pennsylvania. Gary's applied for admission of the 
new store to U.S. Healthcare's pharmacy network. Wolfson, 
acting as director of U.S. Healthcare's pharmacy program, 
advised Brownstein not to process the application. 
U.S. Healthcare's executives acknowledged in their 
testimony that their motivation in refusing to process 
Gary's application was retaliatory, based on a belief that 
Gary's did not deserve U.S. Healthcare's business once 
Gary's had terminated U.S. Healthcare's contract in a 
manner that Wolfson and Brownstein found to be offensive. 
In compliance with Wolfson's instructions, Brownstein did 
not process the application. However, at this time, no one 
at U.S. Healthcare told Gary's of the decision to refuse to 
process the application. Instead, Gary's was informed that 
the application would be processed in due course. As 
Wolfson conceded at trial, the plan was to "let [Gary's] hang 
. . . until they did something." 
 
At the same time that Gary's Abington store applied for 
membership in the pharmacy network, U.S. Healthcare, at 
the instruction of Brownstein, performed a two-day, on-site 
audit of the utilization of generic drugs at Gary's store in 
Eagleville, Pennsylvania. The audit measured the 
pharmacy's compliance with the requirement of 
U.S. Healthcare's provider agreement that generic drugs be 
used whenever possible to contain costs. The audit results 
suggested that Gary's dispensed brand-name drugs instead 
of generic drugs at a rate higher than the median of the 
U.S. Healthcare provider, and lacked complete 
documentation of prescription requests. Brownstein's audit 
also demonstrated that the average cost-per-prescription to 
U.S. Healthcare at the Eagleville pharmacy was in line with 
the network median, so that the store's prescriptions were 
not costing U.S. Healthcare more on average than other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
         Well, I didn't think it was appropriate with an account that we 
had 
         a relationship with just to send a "dear sir" letter [of 
termination] to 
         a post office box . . . . I didn't feel that they were giving us 
due 
         consideration and if they were operating in that fashion, I 
wanted to 
         look to see if in fact there were any other issues related to the 
I Got 
         It At Gary's Pharmacies. 
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pharmacies. Brownstein forwarded the audit results to the 
Quality Assurance Committee, which referred the matter to 
the Peer Review Committee. The Peer Review Committee, 
consisting of three outside pharmacists, had the power to 
recommend sanctions to Wolfson, who would then decide 
whether or not to impose them. 
 
On November 16, 1993, the Peer Review Committee 
recommended that Gary's Eagleville store be put on"freeze" 
for three-months. The freeze was implemented and, as a 
result, U.S. Healthcare removed the Eagleville store from 
the list of approved pharmacies, and new U.S. Healthcare 
subscribers could not designate that store as their location 
for purchasing prescription drugs. In contrast to the 
treatment of Gary's, other pharmacies with generic drug 
utilization rates lower than the Eagleville pharmacy and 
less complete documentation of prescription requests, had 
not been "frozen," and instead had received lesser or no 
sanctions. In fact, the parties stipulated that out of the 
approximately 1300 pharmacies in the U.S. Healthcare 
network for southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New 
Jersey, the freeze sanction had been imposed for generic 
utilization reasons only four times (including its use against 
Gary's) in all of 1993 and 1994. 
 
Although the extent to which Wolfson and Brownstein 
were involved in the implementation of the freeze sanction 
is unclear, both had participated regularly in Quality 
Assurance and Peer Review Committee meetings. 
Brownstein later cited the results of the audit on the 
Eagleville store as the reason for the delay in processing the 
Abington store's application for membership in the 
pharmacy network, stating that U.S. Healthcare had 
concerns about Gary's dispensing too many brand-name 
drugs at its stores. 
 
Faced with a freeze on its Eagleville store and no 
movement on the Abington store's application for 
membership in the pharmacy network, Gary's President, 
Gary Wolf, set up a meeting with U.S. Healthcare officials, 
including Wolfson and marketing executive Scott Murphy, 
for December 1, 1993. Among the issues discussed were 
Gary's generic drug use and the admission of the Abington 
store to the U.S. Healthcare provider network. 
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U.S. Healthcare expressed its displeasure with Gary's 
termination of U.S. Healthcare coverage in 1991, and 
Wolfson commented that "we like to do business with 
people who do business with us." At the same meeting, 
U.S. Healthcare requested and received permission to bid 
on Gary's TPA business for the next annual contract period. 
 
C. Gary's Switch to CHA/U.S. Healthcare 
 
Following the meeting with U.S. Healthcare, Wolf 
instructed his sister, Robin Risler, the Director of Human 
Resources at Gary's, to "take a look at" switching to the 
TPA services offered by CHA at the anniversary date of 
Gary's contract with BCI (at which time the contract could 
be terminated with 30 days advance notice.) Concurrently, 
Wolf sent a letter to Wolfson (dated December 6, 1993) 
expressing, among other things, his "commitment that we 
will do everything possible to afford [U.S. Healthcare/CHA] 
the opportunity to service our company's needs as long as 
the programs are mutually beneficial", and requesting that 
U.S. Healthcare consider acting on the pending application 
for Gary's Abington store. 
 
When the December 6 letter failed to produce any 
movement on the Abington store, Wolf explained to Chen 
that, in order to get the Abington store approved, Gary's 
needed to "appease" U.S. Healthcare, and instructed her to 
write a further letter to U.S. Healthcare assuring them that 
Gary's would consider CHA's bid for its TPA services. This 
letter, dated January 3, 1994, and addressed to Murphy, 
was more explicit then the December 6 letter. It stated: 
 
         As you requested, I am writing you to acknowledge the 
         agreement made between I got it at Gary's and 
         U.S. Healthcare. We agree that as long as there are no 
         additional cost[s] to the plan or reduction in service, 
         US Healthcare will assume the role of TPA for our self 
         insured medical plan on July 1, 1994. 
 
* * * 
 
         We also understand that in anticipation of our 
         strengthening relationship, US Healthcare will release 
         the provider number for our pharmacy in Abington, PA. 
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Chen testified that once this letter was written, it was a 
"foregone conclusion" that, as long as CHA's bid was 
comparable and for the same services, Gary's would switch 
to CHA. As of this time, CHA had not yet submitted a 
formal proposal to Gary's. 
 
In January 1994, within weeks of Chen's letter, 
U.S. Healthcare had inspected the Abington pharmacy, and, 
without further ado, approved its participation in the 
provider network. Brownstein testified that he was informed 
that Gary's had agreed to switch TPAs to CHA, and "on the 
basis of that," was instructed to enroll Gary's Abington 
store in the provider network. U.S. Healthcare acted with 
such speed in approving the Abington store's application for 
membership in the provider network that it failed to follow 
its own standard approval procedures, and did not present 
the store's application to the Membership Application 
Credentials Committee until after the pharmacy was 
already participating as a provider. 
 
In February 1994, U.S. Healthcare lifted the freeze on the 
Eagleville store. Similarly, Gary's sixth pharmacy in Aston, 
Pennsylvania, was accepted into the provider network 
without delay. At approximately this same time, Robin 
Risler, who testified that, ultimately, the selection of a TPA 
was her responsibility, hired an insurance broker to assist 
her in evaluating the competing TPAs. In early June 1994, 
both BCI and CHA submitted bids for Gary's TPA business, 
but CHA was given the opportunity to review BCI's bid 
before submitting its final proposal. In May 1994, even 
before Gary's had received a proposal from U.S. Healthcare, 
Risler told Lori Manley, the BCI customer service 
representative, that Gary's would be switching to 
CHA/U.S. Healthcare. Manley testified that Risler confided 
that she felt she was being "strongarmed" by 
U.S. Healthcare, that "she herself did not want to leave BCI" 
and that the decision "was out of her control." Two other 
BCI employees similarly testified that in the spring of 1994, 
Risler denied having any real choice in the decision to give 
Gary's TPA business to CHA in light of the loss of 
U.S. Healthcare's business that Gary's would suffer if it 
failed to switch TPAs. The testimony with respect to Risler 
of Manley and the two additional BCI employees was 
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admitted over U.S. Healthcare's objection as state of mind 
evidence. See infra note 31. 
 
As the time for Gary's formal switch to CHA drew near, 
U.S. Healthcare scheduled another on-site "quality 
assurance" audit, this time of Gary's Lansdale store for 
June 16, 1994. In the second week of June, Risler officially 
informed BCI of Gary's decision to give its TPA business to 
CHA. After Gary's decision was officially announced, the 
audit of the Lansdale store uncovered no problems. 
Moreover, there were no further audits of Gary's 
pharmacies. 
 
The reasons behind Risler's decision to switch to CHA are 
in dispute. BCI's TPA expert, Carlton Harker, testified that 
for the one year period of 1994-95, the BCI proposal would 
have saved Gary's approximately $64,000, or 14%, 
compared to the proposal submitted by CHA. Harker 
further testified that he did not perceive any significant 
differences in the services provided under the respective 
plans that would explain the cost differential. Risler 
testified that, in making the decision to give Gary's TPA 
business to CHA, she was motivated by non-price, quality 
of service reasons. She also acknowledged, however, that 
she had been satisfied with BCI's services. At all events, the 
results of the decision are clear -- BCI lost its contract with 
Gary's. 
 
In March 1995, BCI filed the present suit challenging the 
defendants' actions that preceded Gary's decision to 
terminate its TPA contract with BCI. BCI proceeded at trial 
against defendants on four counts. Count I alleged that 
U.S. Healthcare, HMO PA, and CHA violated Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1, by tying the participation 
by Gary's in the U.S. Healthcare pharmacy network to the 
purchase of CHA's TPA services for Gary's employees. In 
Count II, BCI alleged that all defendants violated the 
Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. S 1961 et seq., by engaging in or 
conspiring to commit at least two acts of racketeering 
activities, among them extortion, bribery, mail and wire 
fraud, and violations of the Travel Act. 
 
In a Count III, BCI also contended that, to the extent that 
defendants Wolfson, Murphy, and Brownstein were not 
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principal wrongdoers, they are liable for aiding and abetting 
under RICO. Finally, in Count IV, BCI alleged that all 
defendants tortiously interfered with its existing or 
prospective contractual relationship with Gary's in violation 
of state law. BCI sought treble damages and attorneys fees 
under its federal law claims. It also sought punitive 
damages from each defendant in connection with its state 
law claim. 
 
D. Economic Evidence 
 
1. Impact on Gary's 
 
BCI argued at trial that Gary's ability to operate 
profitably depended on the business of U.S. Healthcare 
subscribers. As evidence, BCI pointed to the parties' 
stipulation that, as of December 1993, when Wolfson told 
Gary Wolf that U.S. Healthcare likes to do business with 
people "who do business with us," 9,178 U.S. Healthcare 
subscribers had designated Gary's as their provider 
pharmacy, and that in 1993, Gary's subscribers purchased 
$1.66 million of prescription drugs. BCI's expert Dr. Calvin 
Knowlton, who is an associate professor and Chair of the 
Department of Pharmacy Practice and Pharmacy 
Administration at the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy and 
Science, and the President of the American Pharmaceutical 
Association, testified that, based on the stipulated 
information and Gary's Sales Reports, in 1993, 
U.S. Healthcare members accounted for between 3-15% of 
Gary's prescription drug sales, and, by 1995, for 20% of 
prescription drug sales in Gary's Montgomery County 
stores. 
 
If Gary's operated as an unapproved pharmacy, any 
U.S. Healthcare subscriber who wanted to fill his or her 
prescription at Gary's would have to pay full price, instead 
of a small co-payment. Additionally, Gary's head 
pharmacist testified that prescription drug purchasers are 
valuable consumers because they typically purchase other 
items in addition to their prescription drugs. BCI also 
presented evidence that the prescription drug business of 
pharmacies is a low-margin business that depends on high 
volume in order to operate profitably. In order to maximize 
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their sales, pharmacies typically become members of as 
many prescription drug plans as possible. Out of 
approximately 1300 participating pharmacies in 
southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey, only 
four pharmacies left the U.S. Healthcare pharmacy network 
in the period from January 1, 1993 to October 1, 1995 for 
reasons other than going out of business. 
 
2. Knowlton's Survey 
 
At trial, BCI presented a telephone survey of the market 
areas surrounding several of Gary's pharmacies, performed 
by Dr. Knowlton, which was admitted over objection. In this 
survey, pharmacy students telephoned six to eight 
pharmacies in the vicinity of three arbitrarily selected 
Gary's store locations and asked them a series of questions. 
Knowlton drew conclusions regarding U.S. Healthcare's 
market power based only on the responses of those stores 
that listed U.S. Healthcare as their primary HMO customer. 
He testified that based on this survey U.S. Healthcare's 
market share of prescription drug sales for the market 
areas served by the two largest Gary's pharmacies and the 
new Abington pharmacy was approximately 25%. Knowlton 
further testified that other sources of information indicated 
that his survey conclusions as to market share would apply 
generally in Montgomery County. 
 
3. Interaction Between U.S. Healthcare and Other 
         Pharmacy Operations 
 
The jury also heard evidence of the interaction between 
U.S. Healthcare and Rite-Aid, Shop-Rite, Food Circus, 
Walmart, Phar-mor and Weis Markets. With respect to the 
pharmacy operation in each of these chains, 
U.S. Healthcare conditioned participation in the provider 
network upon their making U.S. Healthcare insurance 
available to their employees. Despite initial resistance, Rite- 
Aid, Phar-Mor and Weis Markets ultimately agreed to offer 
their employees U.S. Healthcare insurance products. There 
was, however, an absence of supporting evidence on the 
point, and it is not clear that these large companies made 
U.S. Healthcare a part of their benefits package in response 
to economic pressure rather than for legitimate business 
reasons. 
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Shop-Rite and Food Circus responded by filing 
complaints with the New Jersey Department of Insurance.4 
After the Department of Insurance took action, 
U.S. Healthcare agreed to accept the stores into its provider 
network notwithstanding their refusal to offer 
U.S. Healthcare coverage. The Walmart stores also resisted 
U.S. Healthcare's policy, choosing instead to forgo 
membership in the provider network. U.S. Healthcare did 
approve the Walmart stores in Massachusetts, where an 
Any Willing Provider statute was in force. Defendants' 
experts testified that linkage of network membership and 
purchase of TPA services was normal business behavior 
and was not anti-competitive. 
 
4. The Setting of Reimbursement Prices 
 
BCI also presented evidence of how U.S. Healthcare 
exercised its market power to set reimbursement prices. In 
January 1996, it effected a drastic reduction in the 
reimbursements it paid to participating pharmacies for 
prescription drugs dispensed to U.S. Healthcare 
subscribers. Dr. Knowlton testified that this reduction, 
when considered with the fact that U.S. Healthcare does not 
pay pharmacies a dispensing fee, made U.S. Healthcare's 
overall compensation to pharmacies the lowest of any third- 
party payor in the southeastern Pennsylvania region. Yet, 
notwithstanding the major reimbursement price reduction, 
only two pharmacies out of approximately 8000 in 12 or 13 
states discontinued their participation in the 
U.S. Healthcare provider network. 
 
Dr. Knowlton testified that, based on this evidence, and 
the evidence of U.S. Healthcare's successful dominance of 
other pharmacies, exclusion from the U.S. Healthcare 
provider network could threaten Gary's survival. As a 
result, he testified that Gary's had no choice but to accept 
U.S. Healthcare's arrangement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The record does not develop the extent to which these complaints may 
have been facilitated by New Jersey's enactment, in July 1994, of an Any 
Willing Provider statute which provides that a pharmacy cannot be 
excluded from an HMO if it "accepts the terms" of the HMO. N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 26:2J-4.7(a)(2) (West 1996). 
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E. The Jury Verdict 
 
After 17 days of trial, the case was submitted to the jury 
on special interrogatories. The jury returned a verdict for 
BCI on all counts and awarded BCI $200,000 in 
compensatory damages.5 The jury also awarded BCI 
$1,000,000 in punitive damages in connection with its 
tortious interference claim. That award was apportioned as 
follows: $400,000 against U.S. Healthcare, $200,000 
against CHA, $100,000 against HMO PA, $200,000 against 
Wolfson, $75,000 against Murphy, and $25,000 against 
Brownstein. 
 
At the close of BCI's case, and again at the close of all 
evidence, the defendants moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(a), for judgment as a matter of law. These motions were 
denied. Following the verdict, defendants renewed their 
motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 50(b). Concurrently, defendants filed an alternative 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The 
district court denied these motions in all respects. On 
appeal, defendants challenge the denial of these motions. 
The majority of the issues before us arise from the district 
court's denial of defendants' renewed motion for judgment 
as a matter of law, and, as to these issues, our review is 
plenary. See Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing, 63 F.3d 
1267, 1270-71 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The legal foundation for the 
jury's verdict is reviewed de novo while the factual findings 
are reviewed to determine whether the evidence and 
justifiable inferences most favorable to the prevailing party 
afford any rational basis for the verdict."). Where a different 
standard of review is implicated, it will be noted in the text. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The district court's initial order of judgment made it unclear whether 
BCI was to receive $200,000 in total compensatory damages, or to 
recover that amount separately on each of its three legal theories (thus 
allowing a total recovery of $600,000 in compensatory damages). In 
response to defendants' motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59(e), 
to alter or amend the order of judgment, the district court subsequently 
amended its order to make clear that BCI may recover only once the 
$200,000 in compensatory damages that it was awarded. BCI does not 
dispute this point on appeal. 
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III. THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 
 
A. Introduction -- Characterization of BCI's Claim 
 
BCI's antitrust claim arises from U.S. Healthcare's 
decision to use the leverage acquired by virtue of its ability 
to provide Gary's access to thousands of potential 
pharmacy customers to pressure Gary's into selection of its 
subsidiary, CHA, as its TPA. BCI claims that this 
arrangement was an illegal tie in violation S 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1, which generally outlaws 
"[e]very contract . . . in restraint of [interstate or 
international] trade or commerce." Defendants submit that 
their conduct was simply hard bargaining that is well 
within the mainstream of business conduct and does not 
form the basis of a cognizable antitrust claim. 
 
At trial, BCI's theory of the case prevailed. The jury found 
that U.S. Healthcare's practices were illegal under both per 
se and rule of reason theories of antitrust liability. On 
appeal, defendants challenge the characterization of the 
arrangement at issue as a tying arrangement. They contend 
that the arrangement was one of reciprocal dealing and not 
tying, and that as a result the per se test for antitrust 
liability is inapplicable. Before turning to a review of the 
jury verdict, which the defendants challenge, we will 
consider the characterization question. 
 
Tying exists where a seller conditions the sale of one good 
(the tying product) on the buyer also purchasing another, 
separate good (the tied product). See Town Sound & Custom 
Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 475 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (in banc). The antitrust concern over tying 
arrangements arises when the seller can exploit its market 
power in the tying market to force buyers to purchase the 
tied product which they otherwise would not, thereby 
restraining competition in the tied product market.6 See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Of course, not all tying arrangements have anti-competitive effects in 
violation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has twice made use of 
the following as an example of a tie that is not a concern of the 
antitrust 
laws: "[I]f one of a dozen food stores in a community were to refuse to 
sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar it would hardly tend to 
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Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 33 F.3d 
194, 200 (3d Cir. 1994); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). 
 
Unlike tying -- where one party is only a seller and the 
other only a buyer -- reciprocal dealing exists where "two 
parties face each other as both buyer and seller. One party 
offers to buy the other party's goods, but only if the second 
party buys other goods from the first party." Spartan Grain 
& Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 1978). More 
colloquially, reciprocal dealing exists when one party tells 
the other: "I'll buy from you, if you buy from me." Again, 
like tying, not all reciprocal dealing arrangements are anti- 
competitive. The Sherman Act is concerned with what has 
been termed "coercive" reciprocal dealing, where a party 
uses its economic power as a purchaser in one market in 
order to restrict competition in another market where it is 
a seller. See Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 
1216 (9th Cir. 1982).7 
 
BCI argued, and the jury found, that U.S. Healthcare and 
CHA tied the purchase of CHA's TPA services to the right to 
continued participation in the U.S. Healthcare pharmacy 
network. In order to characterize this arrangement as a tie, 
U.S. Healthcare must be deemed to have "sold" Gary's the 
ability to participate in its pharmacy network, but only if 
Gary's also purchased CHA's TPA services. Defendants 
contend that BCI's characterization is not correct since 
U.S. Healthcare did not "sell" Gary's the ability to 
participate in the pharmacy network as participation in 
that network is free. In fact, the ultimate result of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
restrain competition if its competitors were ready and able to sell flour 
by itself." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 
(1984) (quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)). 
Indeed package sales such as those noted in the foregoing example may 
be used by a seller as a means of competing, and may be desired by 
buyers. The Sherman Act is not designed to preclude such 
arrangements. See id. 
 
7. This is distinguished from "mutual" reciprocal dealing which occurs 
"when both parties stand on equal footing with respect to purchasing 
power, yet they agree to purchase from one another." Betaseed, 681 F.2d 
at 1216. 
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contract was that money flowed in the opposite direction -- 
from U.S. Healthcare to Gary's in exchange for prescription 
drugs purchased by U.S. Healthcare members that 
designated one of Gary's stores as their network pharmacy. 
Thus, defendants argue, the arrangement is more 
accurately labeled as reciprocal dealing where 
U.S. Healthcare conditioned its agreement to purchase 
prescription drugs from Gary's on Gary's agreement to 
purchase TPA services from CHA. 
 
We agree that the arrangement is not tying. While there 
is force to defendants' broader argument, we do not believe 
that the relationship between Gary's and U.S. Healthcare 
can be neatly squeezed into the purchase/sale paradigm. 
As a result, we are hesitant to conclude that the 
arrangement was reciprocal dealing, but instead believe 
that the true character of the arrangement lies somewhere 
between the two practices. Fortunately, resolution of the 
antitrust issue presented in this appeal does not require us 
to wedge the facts into either doctrinal box, for we conclude 
that there was insufficient evidence to support liability 
under the Sherman Act regardless of the label placed on 
the challenged arrangement. 
 
The law is well developed as to when tying arrangements 
should give rise to liability under the Sherman Act. Such 
arrangements can be deemed illegal per se or be found to 
violate the rule of reason. Per se liability exists where the 
defendant is found to have appreciable market power in the 
tying market. In such cases, the ability to leverage this 
power to restrain trade in the tied market is presumed and 
no inquiry need be made into the actual prevailing market 
conditions in that market. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 
15-18 & n. 25; Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 477. Where 
appreciable tying market power cannot be shown, inquiry 
into the tied product market cannot be avoided, and the 
plaintiff therefore has the more difficult burden of showing 
that the arrangement violated the rule of reason because it 
unreasonably restrained competition in the tied product 
market. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29. 
 
In contrast to tying arrangements, reciprocal dealing has 
not been the subject of extensive case law development. 
Indeed, this Court has yet to set forth a test for determining 
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when a reciprocal dealing arrangement runs afoul of the 
Sherman Act.8 Defendants seek to persuade us to fill this 
vacuum by holding that reciprocal dealing arrangements 
cannot be found illegal per se, but instead should be judged 
only under the less rigorous rule of reason test.9 This 
position has not been adopted by any of our sister circuits. 
All those that have examined the relationship between tying 
and reciprocal dealing have determined that each practice 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Defendants suggest that we set forth a rule for judging reciprocal 
dealing arrangements in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 
F.2d 614, 624 (3d Cir. 1976) where we stated that: 
 
         [T]he use of substantial purchasing power in one product market 
to 
         coerce a supplier into a reciprocating purchase in another market 
         may be an illegal restraint of trade if the user's purchasing 
power is 
         sufficiently substantial and its use results in substantial 
foreclosure 
         of competition in the other weaker product market. 
 
In Gore, the owner of two patents brought an action for infringement. 
The defendant's answer denied the validity of the patents, asserted that 
one of the patents was unenforceable because of fraud in its 
procurement, and counterclaimed for damages alleging a violation of the 
Sherman Act. After trial, the district court entered a judgment holding 
one of the patents valid and infringed and the other patent invalid, 
granting the plaintiff an injunction restraining the defendant from 
infringing the valid patent, and determining that plaintiff had violated 
the Sherman Act. Both parties appealed from the judgment. In 
determining that we had jurisdiction to review the injunction, we 
expressly stated that we had no jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal 
over the antitrust counterclaim of the defendant. See id. at 618. Thus, 
the statement in Gore regarding reciprocal dealing was dicta, and does 
not establish a rule. 
 
9. In support of this view, defendants primarily rely on Phillip E. Areeda 
et al., Antitrust Law, a leading treatise. Areeda argues that "forced 
reciprocal exchanges are . . . legally distinct from ties and need not 
receive the same antitrust treatment." X Areeda, Antitrust Law P 1750c, 
at 268 (1996). He believes that reciprocal trading should not be illegal 
per se, and that such a claim should instead be judged solely under the 
rule of reason test. See Id. P 1778, at 460-61. Professor Areeda's view 
may be colored by his belief that tying arrangements also should not be 
illegal per se, a view that is contrary to current law. See IX Areeda, 
Antitrust Law P 1730, at 406 14 (1991). 
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should be evaluated under both the per se and rule of 
reason tests.10 
 
This position is logical since both practices implicate the 
same antitrust concern -- the unlawful extension of 
economic power in one market to another market. However, 
we decline to resolve this conflict here since the amorphous 
and idiosyncratic nature of this case does not provide an 
appropriate framework in which to fully flesh out the need 
for a separate test for reciprocal dealing arrangements. 
Further, we need not reach this issue in order to resolve 
the present appeal since we find that BCI failed to set forth 
either a valid per se or rule of reason antitrust claim -- a 
finding fatal to both a tying claim and a reciprocal dealing 
claim under any test we might devise. 
 
B. Per se Liability 
 
Since our jurisprudence regarding both per se and rule of 
reason liability has developed in the context of tying cases, 
we will use the terms "tying" product market and "tied" 
product market to describe the two markets at issue 
despite our belief that the arrangement in this case lies 
somewhere between tying and reciprocal dealing. The per se 
test is used in cases where exploitation of leverage in the 
market for the tying product is "probable". See Jefferson 
Parish, 466 U.S. at 15; Town Sound, 959 F.2d. at 476-77. 
The elements of a per se claim are (1) the  defendant seller 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. See, e.g., Betaseed, Inc. v. U&I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1221 (9th Cir. 
1982) ("The similarity between coercive reciprocity and tying 
arrangements, both in form and in anti-competitive consequences, leads 
to the conclusion that the two practices should be judged by similar 
standards."); Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 425 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (holding that label of tying and reciprocal dealing was 
immaterial, and that the per se standard should be applied in both); E.T. 
Barwick Indus. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 692 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Ga. 
1987) (same legal standards apply to reciprocal dealing as tying), aff'd 
891 F.2d 906 (11th Cir. 1989). See also II Earl W. Kintner, Federal 
Antitrust Law S 10.67, at 264-65 (1980) ("[T]he very presence of the 
element of coercion indicates that such reciprocal dealings are only anti- 
competitive in effect. It is widely agreed that coercive reciprocality, 
like 
tying arrangements, should be considered a per se violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act."). 
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must sell two distinct products; (2) the seller mu st possess 
market power in the tying product market; and (3)  a 
substantial amount of interstate commerce must be 
affected. See id. at 477. Where such elements are shown, 
the defendant's tying practices are condemned without 
further proof of anti-competitive effect. See id. Principally at 
issue in this appeal is whether BCI met its burden of 
proving the second element of this test: that 
U.S. Healthcare exercised market power in the tying market.11 
 
The jury determined that U.S. Healthcare exercised 
sufficient market power in the tying market to constitute a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act. The viability of that 
finding, however, depends on the correctness of the market 
definition sent to the jury. Defendants maintain that the 
definition was incorrect as a matter of law, and that 
U.S. Healthcare could not exercise sufficient power in a 
properly defined tying market to sustain a per se claim. 
 
1. Defining the Relevant Market 
 
Before we can evaluate the extent to which 
U.S. Healthcare exercises power in the tying market, that 
market must be properly defined. A market has two 
components, product and geographic. See Brown Shoe Co. 
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-28 (1962). The burden 
is on the plaintiff to define both components of the relevant 
market. See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 
124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 1997); Pastore v. Bell Telephone 
Co., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994); Tunis Bros Co., Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 726 (3d Cir. 1991). The tying 
market definition asserted by BCI and adopted by the jury 
was: "U.S. Healthcare members with prescription drug 
benefits in the areas surrounding . . . Gary's pharmacies in 
suburban Philadelphia." Defendants contend that this 
definition contains both a flawed product market -- 
U.S. Healthcare members with prescription drug benefits-- 
and a flawed geographic market -- the areas surrounding 
Gary's pharmacies in suburban Philadelphia. They submit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The other issues have not been briefed by the parties. The third 
element is plainly not disputed. While arguably there is an implicit 
challenge to the first element, it would involve the characterization 
question, and we need not reach it. 
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instead that the relevant tying market consists of "all 
purchasers of prescription drugs in the greater Philadelphia 
area." 
 
We agree that BCI failed to meet its burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence to support the product and geographic 
markets adopted by the jury. However, while the evidence 
enables us to determine that the proper product market 
consists of all purchasers of prescription drugs, it is more 
difficult to determine the relevant geographic market on the 
basis of the record. Fortunately, as will be shown, 
delineation of the exact contours of the geographic market 
is not necessary to an evaluation of the merit of plaintiff's 
per se claim. We turn first to the product market issue. 
 
         a. The Product Market 
 
BCI has posited a single brand market consisting solely 
of U.S. Healthcare members with prescription drug benefits. 
Should we accept this market definition our inquiry would 
be at an end, for U.S. Healthcare must, by definition, 
control 100% of this product market regardless of the 
geographic market. BCI seeks to support this product 
market by arguing that no products are "reasonably 
interchangeable" with U.S. Healthcare members, and that it 
is compelled by the Supreme Court's decision in Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 
(1992). Examining each of these contentions in turn, we 
conclude that this narrow market definition cannot stand 
as a matter of law. 
 
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined 
by evaluating which products would be reasonably 
interchangeable by consumers for the same purpose. See 
Allen-Myland, 33 F.3d at 201 n.8; Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 
480. "Interchangeability implies that one product is roughly 
equivalent to another for the use to which it is put; while 
there might be some degree of preference for the one over 
the other, either would work effectively." Allen Myland, 33 
F.3d at 206. One measure of interchangeability is "cross 
elasticity of demand between the product itself and 
substitutes for it." Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 437 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)). 
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When there is cross-elasticity of demand between products 
in a market, "the rise in the price of a good within [the] 
relevant market would tend to create a greater demand for 
other like goods in that market." Tunis Brothers, 952 F.2d 
at 722. 
 
Thus the issue is which products, if any, Gary's, the 
consumer, would find to be reasonably interchangeable 
with, or substitutable for, U.S. Healthcare members who 
purchase prescription drugs. Defendants argue that no 
evidence in the record contradicts the logical assumption 
that Gary's considers members of other prescription plans, 
or uninsured persons, completely interchangeable with 
U.S. Healthcare members. We agree. 
 
The only evidence to which BCI directs us to support its 
argument that there are no products reasonably 
interchangeable with U.S. Healthcare customers is that 
when U.S. Healthcare lowered the prices it would pay to 
pharmacies for the purchase of prescription drugs by 
U.S. Healthcare members, none of the pharmacies dropped 
out of the U.S. Healthcare network. BCI asserts that this 
shows that there is no cross-elasticity of demand between 
U.S. Healthcare members and other purchasers of 
prescription drugs since, if there were, then the lowering of 
prices would have caused pharmacies to stop doing 
business with U.S. Healthcare customers in favor of other 
customers who paid more. 
 
This evidence does not support BCI's market definition. 
The fact that participating pharmacies do not drop out of 
the U.S. Healthcare network when it lowers its payment 
schedule does not prove that U.S. Healthcare's action failed 
to increase the pharmacies demand for customers who are 
not members of U.S. Healthcare. Even though pharmacies 
undoubtedly desire higher profit customers, it would not be 
necessary for them to drop out of the U.S. Healthcare 
network in order to pursue, or acquire, these customers. 
Nor would it be economically rational to do so since 
pharmacies, like most businesses, seek as many customers 
as they can find.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We assume that membership in the U.S. Healthcare network 
remained profitable after U.S. Healthcare lowered its payment schedule. 
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Moreover, to the extent that BCI is arguing that 
U.S. Healthcare customers are not interchangeable with 
other customers because the market for prescription 
customers is so competitive that U.S. Healthcare members 
are difficult to replace, this argument also does not support 
its product market definition. Product market definition 
turns on the existence of close substitutes for a particular 
product, not on the ability of any particular consumer to 
switch effortlessly to such substitutes. It is true that when 
Gary's loses a supply of customers it must compete for 
other customers to make up lost sales; however, this does 
not mean that those new customers, when found, would 
not be interchangeable with U.S. Healthcare members from 
Gary's standpoint. 
 
BCI also seeks to support its single brand market by 
reference to the Supreme Court's opinion in Kodak. That 
case, however, is inapposite. In Kodak, independent service 
organizations brought suit alleging that Kodak had tied 
replacement parts for its copiers to Kodak repair service. 
See 504 U.S. at 459. Although Kodak exercised complete 
control over the market for the tying product -- 
replacement parts for its copiers -- since they were unique, 
see id. at 456-57, it argued that it could not, as a matter 
of law, have sufficient market power in that derivative 
aftermarket to restrain trade because the primary market 
for new copiers was competitive. According to Kodak, any 
attempt to exercise market power in the derivative market 
for copier parts would raise the "life cycle" cost of owning a 
Kodak copier, and customers would buy fewer Kodak 
copiers, making the attempt unprofitable. See id. at 470. 
 
The Supreme Court declined to let Kodak's economic 
theory prevail on summary judgment, holding that, under 
certain circumstances, the buyer of a Kodak copier could 
be "locked in" to the Kodak parts market by virtue of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
To the extent that BCI is arguing that pharmacies stayed in the 
U.S. Healthcare network despite the fact that it became unprofitable to 
do so, this argument renders their overall claim a non sequitur. 
U.S. Healthcare cannot exercise control over pharmacies via access to its 
network where membership in that network causes pharmacies to lose 
money. 
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high "switching costs" of purchasing a new copier from 
another manufacturer. See id. at 476. In such a situation, 
Kodak copier owners would be forced to purchase copier 
parts from Kodak since there were no reasonable 
substitutes for such parts. Thus, Kodak establishes that a 
single brand market may be considered the relevant market 
where a legitimate class of consumers is locked in to 
purchasing a non-interchangeable tying product in a 
derivative market due to high switching costs in the 
primary market. See Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 439-40. 
 
BCI directs us to no evidence introduced at trial to 
support a conclusion that Kodak is applicable to this case. 
On appeal, they argue that U.S. Healthcare members are 
"locked in" to U.S. Healthcare and, by extension, to the 
pharmacies in its provider network. We doubt that this 
argument is factually correct, for we find no evidence 
suggesting that U.S. Healthcare members who wish to 
switch HMOs face switching costs significant enough to 
constitute a lock in. But even if it is, the argument is 
misplaced since Kodak is concerned with the situation 
where the victims of the alleged tie -- in that case, the 
purchasers of Kodak copiers -- are faced with high 
switching costs and thus are "locked in" to the market for 
the tying product. Under BCI's theory of the case, Gary's is 
the purchaser of the tying product which is U.S. Healthcare 
members who purchase prescription drugs. Thus in order 
to fall within Kodak's concept of lock in, BCI needed to, at 
a minimum, provide evidence that Gary's -- not 
U.S. Healthcare members -- was locked into the 
U.S. Healthcare network. That it did not do. 
 
         b. The Geographic Market 
 
BCI proposed a non-contiguous, gerrymandered 
geographic market consisting solely of the areas 
surrounding Gary's pharmacies in suburban Philadelphia. 
To meet its burden of proving the relevant geographic 
market, see Tunis Brothers Co., 952 F.2d at 726, BCI was 
required to show that the geographic market it proposed 
was "the area in which a potential buyer may rationally 
look for the goods or services he or she seeks." See id. 
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(quoting Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n of 
Pa., 745 F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
The only evidence that BCI offered to support its 
geographic market was testimony from Dr. Knowlton that 
the area from which Gary's stores, or any pharmacies, draw 
their customers is made up of primary and secondary 
trading areas surroundings its stores. Knowlton defines a 
primary trading area is the geographic area surrounding a 
pharmacy from which it draws 50% of its clientele, and a 
secondary trading area as the geographic area from which 
it draws 90% of its clientele. 
 
We believe that Knowlton is undoubtedly correct to the 
extent that the jury could reasonably find that pharmacy 
customers generally use pharmacies near their home. Thus 
we reject defendants' argument that the relevant geographic 
market should be the greater Philadelphia area.13 However, 
mere invocation of the common-sense precept that 
customers use pharmacies near their homes does not 
satisfy BCI's burden of showing that the particular 
geographic market chosen fairly represents "the area in 
which a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or 
services he or she seeks." In this case, where BCI 
introduced no evidence to support such a conclusion, an 
amorphous and gerrymandered geographic market cannot 
stand as a matter of law. See id. at 727 ("The mere 
delineation of a geographical area, without reference to a 
market as perceived by consumers and suppliers, fails to 
meet the legal standard necessary for the relevant 
geographic market."). 
 
2. U.S. Healthcare's Power in the Tying Market 
 
Having determined that the market definition adopted by 
the jury was erroneous as a matter of law, we are now 
faced with the task of assessing U.S. Healthcare's market 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Defendants rely primarily on evidence that Gary's advertised in the 
greater Philadelphia area to support their expansive conception of the 
geographic market. This reliance is misplaced since "the geographic 
market is not comprised of the region in which the seller attempts to sell 
its product, but rather is comprised of the area where his customers 
would look to buy such a product." Tunis Bros., 952 F.2d at 726. 
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power in a properly defined market on the basis of the trial 
record. Our task is made more difficult by the fact that the 
record does not contain sufficient evidence to enable us to 
clearly define the relevant geographic market. In most 
instances, the proper course in the face of such 
circumstances would be to remand the case for a new trial; 
however, our review of the record indicates that it is simply 
not possible for U.S. Healthcare to have exercised sufficient 
market power in the properly defined product market to 
constitute a per se violation in any plausible geographic 
market. 
 
In order to impose per se antitrust liability, it must be 
shown that the defendant had "appreciable economic power 
in the tying market." Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 (emphasis 
added). "Market power is defined as the ability`to raise 
prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms 
that could not be exacted in a completely competitive 
market.' " Allen-Myland, 33 F.3d at 200 (quoting United 
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 429 
U.S. 610, 620 (1977)). Since "[t]he existence of such power 
ordinarily is inferred from the seller's possession of a 
predominant share of the market," Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 
(citations omitted), we turn first to an inquiry into 
U.S. Healthcare's share of the market for drug prescription 
customers. In so doing, we are mindful of the fact that 
"[m]arket share, of course, is only one type of evidence that 
may prove the defendant has sufficient market power to 
impose per se antitrust liability." Allen-Myland, 33 F.3d at 
209. 
 
         a. Evidence of Market Share 
 
At trial, BCI's sole evidence of market share derived from 
a survey conducted by Dr. Knowlton. His survey concluded 
that U.S. Healthcare members purchased twenty to twenty- 
five percent of the prescriptions at the surveyed 
pharmacies. Defendants argue that this market share is 
insufficient as a matter of law to serve as the basis for a 
finding of a per se violation. We agree.14 The highest 
 
(Text continued on page 36) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Defendants also argue that the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting the survey. We also agree with this contention; however, since 
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we conclude that even if the survey were admitted, it would not help 
BCI, we address the methodological errors that should have barred its 
admission only briefly. 
 
Survey results offered as proof of the matter asserted are hearsay, and 
thus the results of a survey, and any testimony based on those results, 
cannot be admitted into evidence unless the survey falls into a 
recognized class exception to the hearsay rule or into the residual 
exception contained in Fed. R. Evid. 803(24). See Pittsburgh Press Club 
v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 755-58 (3d Cir. 1978). In this case none 
of the class exceptions are present, so we examine whether the survey 
contains the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" required for 
admissibility under Rule 803(24). 
 
In Pittsburgh Press, we stated that "the circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness are for the most part satisfied if the poll is conducted 
in 
accordance with generally accepted survey principles." Id. at 758. We 
then discussed several factors which must be examined in determining 
whether a poll meets generally accepted survey principles 
 
         A proper universe must be examined and a representative sample 
         must be chosen; the persons conducting the survey must be 
         experts; the data must be properly gathered and accurately 
         reported. It is essential that the sample design, the 
questionnaires 
         and the manner of interviewing meet the standards of objective 
         surveying and statistical techniques. 
 
Id. 
 
The proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing these 
elements of admissibility. See id. In this case, we find that this burden 
was not met and that the methodology of the survey was so flawed that 
the district court's decision to admit it was not consistent with the 
exercise of sound discretion. 
 
Knowlton's survey was designed to determine U.S. Healthcare's market 
share in the region close to three of Gary's six pharmacy locations. To 
determine market share, he had pharmacy students call six to eight to 
pharmacies within varying distances of each of the three pharmacies 
(resulting in a total universe of twenty pharmacies). The pharmacists at 
these pharmacies were then asked to name the HMO with which they 
did the majority of their business, and to report the percentage of their 
prescription business for which that HMO was responsible. 
 
This methodology is flawed in several respects. We identify two 
particularly significant errors. First, the survey questions used were not 
objective. For example, pharmacists were asked: 
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estimate of U.S. Healthcare's market share resulting from 
Knowlton's survey -- which, in addition to the 
methodological errors set out in note 14, used the improper 
geographic market discussed at pp. 32-33, supra -- was 
twenty five percent. Even were we to accept this percentage 
as accurate, it is insufficient in itself to impose per se 
antitrust liability. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27 
(defendant hospital's 30 percent share of market showed 
that it lacked the "kind of dominant market position that 
obviates the need for further inquiry into competitive 
conditions."); see also Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594, 612-13 (1953) (defendants share of 
33-40 percent of advertising market insufficient to invoke 
per se rule). In fact, since Jefferson Parish no court has 
inferred substantial market power from a market share 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
         You provide services for people with prescription cards, like PCS 
and 
         Paid, et cetera. You also provide services for people on specific 
HMO 
         plans like Keystone, U.S. Healthcare, et cetera. What's the name 
of 
         the HMO with which you did the most prescription business . . .? 
 
This question improperly slants the response by highlighting respondent 
to U.S. Healthcare's market presence. People responding to a survey tend 
to react to the framing of a question. See, e.g. J.R. Eiser, Social 
Psychology 219-20 (1986). In addition, this question specifically excluded 
large institutional, non-HMO purchasers of prescription drugs such as 
PCS and PAID. As a result, it narrowed the product market from 
"purchasers of prescription drugs" to "HMO purchasers of prescription 
drugs". 
 
Second, while Knowlton surveyed 20 pharmacies, he only used the 
data obtained from 14 of those pharmacies in tabulating his results. 
This decision resulted from the fact that only fourteen of the twenty 
pharmacies surveyed named U.S. Healthcare as their largest HMO 
customer. Knowlton simply ignored the other six pharmacies whose data 
presumably stated a lower estimate of U.S. Healthcare's market share. 
This type of selective analysis violates the requirement that, in order 
for 
survey results to be admissible, the "data must be properly gathered and 
accurately reported". 
 
We conclude that the cumulative effect of these, and other, 
methodological errors render it impossible to say that this survey was 
"conducted in accordance with generally accepted survey principles," and 
thus it should not have been admitted. 
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below 30 percent. See, e.g. Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 481 
(affirming summary judgment for defendant with control of 
10-12% of tying product market); Marts v. Xerox, 77 F.3d 
1109, 1113 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996) (18% share of one portion 
of photocopier market too small for unlawful tying); 
Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 44 F.3d 
1465, 1482 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of summary 
judgment for defendants where defendants controlled less 
than 10% of relevant market, since "plaintiffs failed to 
establish defendants had sufficient strength in the relevant 
market."), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 116 
S. Ct. 1843 (1996); Breaux Bros. Farms, Inc. v. Teche Sugar 
Co., Inc, 21 F.3d 83, 87-88 (5th Cir. 1994) (17.5 percent 
share of relevant market for tying product "is not normally 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the per se rule."). 
 
Because U.S. Healthcare's true market share in a 
properly defined geographic area could be no higher than 
25 percent, plaintiff's cannot rely solely on market share to 
establish a per se antitrust violation.15 
 
         b. Other Factors Bearing on Market Power 
 
Factors other than market share can establish that 
U.S. Healthcare exercised appreciable power in the market 
for pharmaceutical customers. See Allen-Myland, 33 F.3d at 
209. BCI contends that in this case market power can be 
inferred from the numerosity of the ties imposed by the 
defendants, and by "market realities" which indicate that 
the figures for prescription drug sales understate the 
importance of U.S. Healthcare members to a pharmacy's 
bottom line. 
 
In order to demonstrate tying market power through 
evidence of the widespread acceptance of a tie, the plaintiff 
must show that the tie was accepted by an appreciable 
number of buyers within that market, and that there is an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We note that evidence produced at trial showed that 16% of the 
residents of the greater Philadelphia area belong to a U.S. Healthcare 
plan. We assume, therefore, that U.S. Healthcare's market share in the 
relevant geographic market lies somewhere between 16%, its share in an 
impermissibly broad geographic market, and 25%, its share in an 
impermissibly narrow one. 
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"absence of other explanations for the[ir] willingness . . . to 
purchase the package." See Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 618 
n.10 (1977); see also Grappone, Inc v. Subaru of New 
England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(widespread acceptance of tie not evidence of market power 
where there are plausible business reasons for accepting 
tie). In this case, BCI has failed to meet its burden. 
 
At trial, the only evidence offered by BCI concerning other 
ties by defendants was that, with respect to six large chains 
-- Rite-Aid, Shop-Rite, Food Circus, Walmart, Phar-mor 
and Weis Markets -- defendants attempted to tie approval 
of additional pharmacies for participation in the 
U.S. Healthcare network to each chain agreeing to offer 
CHA and/or U.S. Healthcare to its employees. Of these 
purported tying attempts, only three -- those involving Rite- 
Aid, Phar-Mor and Weis Markets -- were deemed 
"successful" by the plaintiff. However, as we have already 
observed, BCI failed to demonstrate that these large 
companies did not base their decision to make 
U.S. Healthcare a part of their benefits package on 
plausible business reasons, see supra pp. 20-21. Without 
some such showing, the evidence of other tie-ins is 
insufficient to constitute proof of appreciable market power.16 
 
BCI also argues that market power can be inferred from 
the fact that exclusion from the U.S. Healthcare pharmacy 
network would have a major adverse impact on a 
pharmacy, to the point of threatening that pharmacy's 
survival. BCI submits that since the prescription drug 
business is a low-margin business that depends on high 
volume, large purchasers such as U.S. Healthcare exert 
considerable market power. As an example of this market 
power, BCI again directs us to the evidence that 
U.S. Healthcare was able to lower its payment schedule to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. We further note that while it is apparent that Rite-Aid, Phar-Mor and 
Weis Markets are large chains, pharmacies are only a part of their 
business and BCI has offered no specific evidence that the number of 
pharmacies affected by the alleged tie-ins constituted "an appreciable 
number of buyers within the market." 
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pharmacies without loss of pharmacy participation in its 
network.17 
 
This argument has two flaws. In the first instance, it 
proves too much. The evidence at trial showed that Gary's 
was a member of forty or more networks that provided 
access to pharmaceutical customers. There is no evidence, 
and no reason to believe, that the customers that 
U.S. Healthcare delivers are any more desirable than those 
delivered by other networks. Thus, if we accept the logic of 
BCI's argument, each of these networks exercises sufficient 
market power to violate the per se rule of antitrust liability. 
Yet, it would pervert the antitrust notion of market power 
to find that each of over forty organizations, delivering the 
same product, has sufficient market power over a 
pharmacy such as Gary's to generate a per se violation of 
the antitrust laws. 
 
BCI's argument also runs counter to the purpose of the 
antitrust laws. "The purpose of the Sherman Act `is not to 
protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to 
protect the public from the failure of the market.' " Queen 
City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 441 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. 
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)); see also Town 
Sound, 959 F.2d at 494 (it is "no concern of the antitrust 
laws" that a practice may consign even an entire "class of 
competitors . . . to competitive oblivion," unless "consumers 
[a]re also hurt because of diminished competition."); United 
States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 
1990) ("[i]t can't be said often enough that the antitrust 
laws protect competition, not competitors."). If we were to 
accept BCI's argument that a showing of appreciable 
market power can be based solely on a pharmacy's "need" 
for customers, we would in effect outlaw the agglomeration 
of pharmacy customers -- a result that provides benefits to 
individual consumers -- in order to protect pharmacies. 
This result would stand antitrust jurisprudence on its 
head, and establish a precedent whereby the antitrust laws 
would protect competitors rather than competition and 
consumers. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See supra p. 21. 
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C. The Rule of Reason Claim 
 
The jury also found that defendants were liable under the 
rule of reason standard for antitrust violations. Unlike a per 
se case where a showing that the defendant had market 
power in the tying market leads to a presumption that it is 
using that power to expand into the tied market, to succeed 
on a rule of reason claim the plaintiff must prove that the 
alleged tie "unreasonably restrained competition." Jefferson 
Parish, 466 U.S. at 29; see also Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 
495 (in order to support a rule of reason claim, plaintiff 
must prove that the tie in question caused an "injury to 
competition"). This burden "necessarily involves an inquiry 
into the actual effect of the [challenged conduct] on 
competition [in the tied market]." 466 U.S. at 29.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. BCI contends that by failing to specifically challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence of anti-competitive effects in the tied market in their 
pre- 
verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law made pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 50(a), defendants waived their right to raise that specific 
argument in their post-trial Rule 50 motions, or thereafter. In their pre- 
trial motions, made both at the conclusion of plaintiff's case and at the 
conclusion of all evidence, the defendants' challenge to the sufficiency 
of 
the evidence on the rule of reason claim read: 
 
         The evidence is insufficient to support a finding or sustain a 
verdict 
         that U.S. Healthcare's practices constituted an unreasonable 
         restraint of trade in light of all the circumstances of the case. 
         Plaintiff has offered no such evidence. 
 
Under Rule 50(a), a pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law 
"shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which 
the moving party is entitled to the judgment." Further, a post-trial 
motion for judgment as a matter of law made pursuant to Rule 50(b) 
"must be preceded by a Rule 50(a) motion sufficiently specific to afford 
the party against whom the motion is directed with an opportunity to 
cure possible defects in proof which otherwise might make its case 
legally insufficient." Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 
1173 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 
831-32 (3d Cir. 1983)); see also Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 
980 F.2d 171, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1992) (compliance with Rule 50(a) 
"ensures that the party bearing the burden of proof will have an 
opportunity to buttress its case before it goes to the jury and the moving 
party will not gain unfair advantage through surprise."). 
 
While the text of the Rule 50(a) motion quoted above is far from a 
model of completeness or clarity, we do not measure its sufficiency by 
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Before we can determine whether there was harm to 
competition in the tied market, that market must be 
defined. BCI had the burden of defining the tied market, 
but made no attempt to do so at trial. On appeal, BCI 
contends that the tied market consists of the market for the 
provision of health insurance and benefits -- a market that 
includes HMOs and personal choice plans in addition to 
TPAs. We find no support for this broad market definition. 
Instead, we believe, on the basis of the record, that the 
proper tied market consists solely of the market for TPA 
services. BCI is a TPA provider and the harm alleged to 
have occurred as result of the tying arrangement took place 
in the market for TPA services. 
 
In that market, the only evidence of harm to competition 
was that BCI failed to renew one contract, its contract with 
Gary's. That showing is insufficient as a matter of law since 
it fails to show competitive harm to the tied market as a 
whole. See Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 493 (requiring 
foreclosure of a "substantial portion" of the tied market to 
hurt competition.); see also Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. 
Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F.2d 1318, 1330 (6th Cir.) ("[t]he 
foreclosure of 400 computer systems out of the thousands 
of systems [in the tied market] is insignificant as a matter 
of law"), vacated, 506 U.S. 910 (1992), reinstated in 
pertinent part, 11 F.3d 660, 663-64 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 
Moreover, even if we accepted the broad market which 
BCI proposed, it still failed to provide sufficient evidence of 
competitive harm. The only evidence offered to show that 
competition was adversely affected in this broad market 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the text alone, but against the background, as reflected in the record, of 
what the party now claiming waiver understood as to the tenor of the 
Rule 50 movant's position and theory. See Acosta, 717 F.2d at 832 
("[T]he communicative content, `specificity' and notice giving function of 
an assertion [in a rule 50(a) motion] should be judged in context.") In 
Fineman, for example, we held that a general motion for a directed 
verdict contesting the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to 
"coercion" preserved defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence with respect to the tortious interference claim, because 
"plaintiffs' counsel was clearly on notice of the legal rubric under which 
[defendants] planned to proceed." 980 F.2d at 184. We think that is the 
case here, and hence find no waiver. 
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consisted of the previously mentioned studies of several 
large pharmacy chains which faced pressure to offer their 
employees membership in the U.S. Healthcare HMO. These 
studies do not provide any evidence of market foreclosure 
or harm to competition since those pharmacies that were 
"forced" to offer their employees U.S. Healthcare coverage 
did so in addition to, rather than instead of, other health 
insurance plans. Further, even if this evidence did show 
harm to competition, BCI has introduced no evidence in 
which to evaluate the extent to which such foreclosure 
harmed competition in the broad market for health 
insurance services generally. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
Since the record before us does not support a finding 
that U.S. Healthcare exercised appreciable market power in 
a properly defined tying market or that the arrangement at 
issue harmed competition in the tied market, the antitrust 
jury verdicts on both the per se and the rule of reason 
claims must be set aside.19 
 
IV. CIVIL RICO 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The jury found that U.S. Healthcare's business practices 
constituted a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 
18 U.S.C. SS 1962(c) and (d). Section 1962(c) prohibits any 
person employed by or associated with an enterprise from 
conducting or participating in the conduct of that 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity. A pattern of racketeering activity "requires at least 
two acts of racketeering activity", 18 U.S.C.S 1961(5). 
Racketeering activity is defined as an act or threat 
chargeable as one of a variety of state felonies or any act 
which is "indictable" under specifically listed federal 
criminal statutes, see 18 U.S.C. S 1961(A)-(B). Section 
1962(d) outlaws any conspiracy to violate the other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Since we find that the jury verdict must be set aside, we need not 
address defendants challenge to the rule of reason jury instructions. 
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subsections of S 1962, including, as is relevant to this case, 
S 1962(c). 
 
U.S. Healthcare challenges the jury verdict on two 
primary grounds, asserting that (1) BCI failed to establish 
its standing to recover for any offenses allegedly committed 
against Gary's; and (2) BCI failed to present a su stainable 
case that the defendants committed any of the alleged 
predicate acts. We address each argument in turn. 
 
B. RICO Standing 
 
The section of RICO allowing private parties such as BCI 
to pursue a civil action provides that: 
 
         [a]ny person injured in his business by reason of a 
         violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue 
         therefor in any appropriate United States district court 
         and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains 
         and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
         attorney's fee. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1964(c) 
 
The Supreme Court examined the standing requirement 
of this statutory provision in Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992). The Court noted that 
Congress modeled S 1964(c) on the Clayton Act, and found 
that a plaintiff's right to sue under RICO, as under the 
federal antitrust laws, requires a showing that the alleged 
violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 
See id. at 267-68. The Court looked to the common law for 
guidance in defining the proximate cause requirement. In 
so doing, it focused primarily on one element of proximate 
cause: the directness of the relationship "between the 
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged." Id. at 
268. This requirement of a direct relation was held to 
generally preclude recovery by "a plaintiff who complained 
of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a 
third person by the defendant's acts." Id. at 268-69. 
 
On the facts presented in Holmes, the Court held that the 
plaintiff, Securities and Investor Protection Corporation 
("SIPC"), had not met the proximate cause requirement and 
thus had no standing to bring suit under RICO . SIPC is a 
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private nonprofit corporation, created pursuant to the 
Securities Investors Act, which most broker-dealers are 
required by law to join and which has a statutory duty to 
advance funds to reimburse the customers of member 
broker-dealers that are unable to meet their obligations. 
See id. at 261. SIPC brought a civil RICO action alleging 
that Holmes, and other former members of a brokerage 
firm, conspired in a stock manipulation scheme that 
prevented two broker-dealers from meeting their 
obligations, thereby requiring SIPC to advance nearly $13 
million to cover claims by the customers of the affected 
broker-dealers. SIPC sought standing under S 1964(c) by 
arguing, inter alia, that it was subrogated to the rights of 
those customers of the broker-dealers who did not 
purchase the manipulated securities but incurred loses 
when the broker-dealers failed and could no longer meet 
their obligations. See id. at 270. 
 
The Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that SIPC 
was entitled to stand in the shoes of the non-purchasing 
customers, but held that the defendants' conduct was not 
the proximate cause of those customers' injuries. The Court 
held that "the link is too remote between the stock 
manipulation alleged and the customers' harm, being 
purely contingent on the harm suffered by the broker 
dealers . . . [t]he broker-dealers simply cannot pay their 
bills, and only that intervening insolvency connects the 
conspirators' acts to the losses suffered by the non- 
purchasing customers and general creditors." Id. at 271. 
 
Defendants' argue that, under Holmes, BCI lacks 
standing in this case. They assert that since BCI is alleging 
that Gary's has been a victim of the RICO predicate acts, 
BCI exemplifies the "plaintiff who complain[s] of harm 
flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third 
person." Id. at 268. We disagree. The injury proved by BCI, 
the loss of its TPA contract with Gary's, is not derivative of 
any losses suffered by Gary's. Unlike the injuries suffered 
by the non-purchasing customers in Holmes, BCI's injury 
was not contingent upon any injury to Gary's, nor is it 
more appropriately attributable to an intervening cause 
that was not a predicate act under RICO. Here, BCI's TPA 
relationship with Gary's was a direct target of the alleged 
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scheme -- indeed, interference with that relationship may 
well be deemed the linchpin of the scheme's success. 
Accordingly, we conclude that BCI had standing to pursue 
its civil RICO claim.20 
 
C. Predicate Acts of BCI's RICO Claim 
 
In its special verdict form, the jury found that each 
defendant had committed one or more types of the 
predicate acts of: (1) extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 
U.S.C. S 1951; (2) violation of Pennsylvania's commercial 
bribery statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 4108(b); (3) mail fraud, 
18 U.S.C. S 1341; (4) wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. S 1343; and 
(5) violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1952. Defendants 
challenge the verdict on the ground that BCI has failed to 
prove that defendants' conduct violated any of these laws. 
Defendants contend that this failure to prove any predicate 
acts, and a fortiori to show a pattern of racketeering 
activity, entitles them to judgment as a matter of law on the 
RICO claims. In their submission, the conduct underlying 
each of the alleged predicate acts was at its bottom no more 
than aggressive business bargaining and, just as BCI 
cannot convert aggressive business tactics into antitrust 
violations, it cannot shoehorn such tactics into the 
definitions of the predicate acts at issue here. We shall 
devote the bulk of our time to the important and difficult 
issue of whether the defendants' conduct amounted to 
Hobbs Act extortion. The others alleged predicate acts are 
disposed of easily . 
 
1. Extortion under the Hobbs Act 
 
The Hobbs Act imposes criminal penalties on "[w]hoever 
in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce 
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, 
by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires to do so." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. We note, however, that BCI's RICO standing is limited to injuries 
arising from its competition with U.S. Healthcare for Gary's TPA 
business. BCI does not have RICO standing to recover for any injuries 
suffered by other pharmacies as a result of their relations with 
U.S. Healthcare since there is no evidence that these relations directly 
injured BCI. 
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18 U.S.C. S 1951. "Extortion" is defined in the Act as "the 
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, 
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, 
violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. 
S 1951(b)(2). The term "fear" includes the fear of economic 
loss. See United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d 
Cir. 1972); United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (in banc). 
 
BCI alleges that the defendants extorted Gary's health 
benefits business by conditioning access to the 
U.S. Healthcare provider network on Gary's agreement to 
switch to CHA as its TPA. According to BCI, this conduct 
amounts to extortion through the wrongful use of the fear 
of economic loss. Defendants respond that the use of 
economic leverage in this manner cannot be made tofit 
within the statutory framework of Hobbs Act extortion. 
They reason that any fear of economic loss felt by Gary's 
was the result of the give and take of bargaining between 
U.S. Healthcare and Gary's in a business setting in which 
both parties offered and received something of value. They 
contend that the use of this economic fear to extract 
concessions from Gary's was not wrongful, as required by 
the Hobbs Act, but is instead part and parcel of normal 
business negotiations. 
 
As will appear, we conclude that plaintiff's theory, which 
is quite ingenious, does not state a viable claim of extortion 
because the defendants' use of the fear of economic loss in 
the context of hard business bargaining was not (legally) 
wrongful. While this decision may seem compelled by 
common sense, it is not easily derived from our precedent. 
This Court has not had prior occasion to address the line 
separating the legitimate use of economic fear to acquire 
property in a business setting (i.e., hard bargaining) from 
the wrongful use of such fear (i.e., extortion). Accordingly, 
we turn for guidance to the decisions of those few courts 
that have previously faced the issue. Because it looms so 
large on the Hobbs Act landscape, we must first, however, 
consider the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), which construes the 
meaning of the term "wrongful" under the Act. 
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